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TORT LAW-FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-AcCRUAL OF MEDI­
CAL MALPRACTICE ACTION-United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. III 
(1979). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The date when a tort action "accrues," thereby triggering the 
running of the statute of limitations, historically has been contested. 
The importance of the accrual date is that the running of the statute 
of limitations effectively precludes recovery for an otherwise valid 
claim. The United States Supreme Court recently has provided ex­
press guidelines for determining when a medical malpractice claim 
against the federal government will accrue. 
In United States v. Kubrick, 1 Justice White, writing for a six-to­
three majority, reversed the Third Circuit which affirmed a Penn­
sylvania district court decision regarding accrual of a medical mal­
'practice claim against the federal government. The Supreme Court 
held that the statute of limitations2 for actions brought under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act (FT~A)3 barred recovery for a patient 
treated at a Veterans Administration Hospital (VA Hospital). The 
patient knew that the treatment he received had caused his deafness, 
but did not suspect, until twenty-nine months later, that he had re­
ceived negligently performed medical treatment.4 
On Apri12, 1968, William Kubrick, a Korean War veteran, was 
admitted to the Wilkes Barre, Pennsylvania VA Hospital for treat­
~ent of osteomyelitisS of the right femur. After surgery, the infec­
tious area was irrigated for thirteen days with a highly effective 
1. 444 u.s. III (1979). 
2. 28 U.S.C. § 240I(b) (1976). 
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is 
presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after 
such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months after the date of 
mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by 
the agency to which it was presented. 
Id. 
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976). ''The United States shall be liable, respecting the pro­
visions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a 
private individual under like circumstances but shall not be liable for interest prior to 
judgement or for punitive damages. . ..n Id. 
4. 444 U.S. at 118-22. 
S. Osteomyelitis is an "[iJnftamation of a bone and its marrow, caused by infection 
ISS 

156 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:155 
antibiotic, neomycin. The drug was but one of many antibiotics that 
could have been used for such treatment. Unfortunately, the large 
doses of neomycin, which eliminated the infection in his leg, caused 
tinnitus6 accompanied by a partial hearing loss.7 This condition 
manifested itself in mid-June, about six weeks after Kubrick's dis­
charge from the hospital. 8 
Kubrick was later examined by a host of doctors for his hearing 
problem.9 In January 1969, Kubrick was informed that it was possi­
ble that the neomycin treatment administered by the VA Hospital 
was the cause of his hearing impairment. to Believing that his hear­
ing impairment was the result of an unavoidable risk associated with 
the neomycin irrigation treatment and not suspicious of any possibil­
ity of malpractice~ Kubrick continued correctional treatment for his 
hearing. I I 
It was not until June 2, 1971 that Kubrick was informed by one 
of his doctors that the neomycin should not have been administered 
in 1968}2 This was the first time that anyone had suggested to 
Kubrick that negligence may have been involved. Kubrick thereaf­
ter brought a medical malpractice suit against the government under 
the FTCA. 
The district court awarded damages to Kubrick for the VA Hos­
pital's negligence in using the neomycin. The court rejected the gov­
ernment's argument that the suit was barred by the expiration of the 
limitations period. The court held that the statute began to run not 
when Kubrick became aware of the adverse injury and its cause but 
when Kubrick "had reason at least to suspect that a legal duty to him 
had been breached."13 The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the 
with bacteria or other microorganisms." J. SCHMIDT, ATIORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF 
MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER 0-56 (1981). 
6. Tinnitis is "[a) ringing, hissing, roaring, or buzzing sound heard by a patient 
although no sound is actually being produced; i.e., a subjective sensation ofsound in the 
ears." Id at T-75. 
7. Kubrick v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 166, 170-72 (E.D. Pa. 1977), tifid inpart, 
remantJ.ed in parI, 581 F.2d 1092 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. JlI (1979). 
8. 444 U.S. at 113. 
9. Kubrick v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 166, 171 (E.D. Pa. 1977), tifid in parI, 
remanded in parI, 581 F.2d 1092 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. III (1979). 
10. 444 U.S. at 114. 
II. Kubrick v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 166, 172 (E.D. Pa. 1977), tifid in parI, 
remanded in parI, 581 F.2d 1092 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. JlI (1979). There was 
considerable evidence, however, that would support the view that Kubrick did suspect 
negligence. Id at 173. 
12. Id at 173. 
13. Id at 185. 
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statute does not run when the plaintiff can prove that "in the exercise 
of due diligence he did not know, nor should he have known, facts 
which would have alerted a reasonable person to the possibility that 
the treatment was improper ...."14 
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in 
January 1969, Kubrick was aware of his injury and its probable 
cause and therefore, at that point, his claim accrued under the 
FTCAls The Court stated that the purpose of the limitations period 
is for claimants to determine if they have a viable cause of action 
and, consequently, whether they should bring suit,16 
This note will trace the developmental setting of the "accrual" 
issue in part II with an examination of the policies supporting stat­
utes of limitations. Parts III and IV will analyze Kubrick and the 
issue will be compared with the manner in which state jurisdictions 
have resolved the problem. Finally, the practical impact of Kubrick 
will be discussed in part V of this note. 
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
To appreciate the essence of Kubrick, a basic understanding of 
the underlying policies and objectives of statutes of limitations is 
necessary. Statutes of limitations -rest on principles of sound public 
policy by "requiring parties to settle their business matters within 
certain reasonable periods."17 Therefore, they promote the peace 
and welfare of society by not allowing affairs to "long remain uncer­
tain."18 Statutes of limitations are characteristically statutes of re­
pose based upon the proposition that persons who "sleep upon their 
right" to bring a cause of action may lose that right after a specified 
period of time. 19 The obvious effect of placing a limitation on an 
action is that it effectively deprives one party of the opportunity, af­
ter a time, to pursue an otherwise valid claim.20 The primary argu­
ment in favor of statutes of limitations is that of fairness to the 
defendant,21 ''There comes a time when ... [a defendant] ought to 
14. Kubrick v. United States, 581 F.2d 1092, 1097 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 
III (1979). 
15. 444 U.S. at 118-23. 
16. Id at 124. 
17. H. WOOD, LIMITATION OF ACTION 8 (2d ed. 1893). 
18. H. BUSWELL, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND ADVERSE POSSESSION 7 (1889). 
19. See Order ofR.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 
348-49 (1944). 
20. Developments In The Law--StalUtes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1l77, 
1185 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Statutes ofLimitationsj. 
21. Id 
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be secure in his reasonable expectation that the slate has been wiped 
clean of ancient obligations."22 Statutes of limitations are designed 
to "promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of 
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been 
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared."23 They 
also relieve the court of the burden of adjudicating stale claims.24 
The common law imposed no limit on the time in which an ac­
tion had to be brought.2s Therefore, any limitation placed on an 
action is the result of statutory enactment.26 While the interests of 
the defendant dictate that he be free from defending against stale 
claims, the plaintiffs right to have reasonable access to the courts to 
litigate meritorious claims must also be protected. In enacting stat­
utes of limitations, therefore, legislatures must strike a balance be­
tween the plaintiffs right to litigate meritorious claims and the 
defendant's right to be free from defending against stale claims.27 
Statutes of limitations usually begin to run when a cause of ac­
tion accrues.28 A cause of action is said to accrue when a successful 
suit can be maintained.29 The general rule for personal actions is 
that a claim accrues when the tortious act or omission is commit­
ted.30 Under these circumstances, the tortious act itself is regarded 
as the ground for the action and all damages resulting from the act 
need not be sustained at that time.31 . 
Against the background of the act or omission rule emerged the 
tort of medical negligence. Because of the nature of medical negli­
gence,32 the harm resulting from the tortious act or omission of a 
22. Id 
23. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 
348-49 (1944). 
24. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965). 
25. H. WOOD, supra note 17, at 4. 
26. Id 
27. Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wash. 2d 660, 665-66, 453 P.2d 631, 635 (1969). 
28. Statutes ofLimitations, supra note 20, at 1200. 
29. Id 
30. Giambozi v. Peters, 127 Conn. 380, 384, 16 A.2d 833, 835 (1940); Cristiani v. 
City of Sarasota, 65 So. 2d 878, 879 (Fla. 1953). 
31. Lattin v. Gillette, 95 Cal. 317, 319, 30 P. 545, 546 (1892); Sonbergh v. Mac­
Quarrie, 112 Cal. App. 2d 771, 773, 247 P.2d 133, 135 (1952); Ogg v. Robb, 181 Iowa 145, 
155,162 N.W. 217, 220 (1917); Brown v. Tenn. Consol. Coal Co., 19 Tenn. App. 123, 138, 
83 S.W.2d 568, 577 (1935). 
32. One group of cases in which there has been extensive departure from 
the earlier rule iliat the statute of limitations runs although the plaintiff has no 
knowledge of the injury has involved actions for mediCal malpractice. Two 
reasons can be su~ested as to why there has been a change in the rule in many 
jurisdictions in t1ili area. One is the fact that in most instances the statutory 
period within which the action must be initiated is short- one year, or at most 
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doctor may not manifest itself or become noticed by the plaintiff un­
til after the normal limitations period has expired. Courts recog­
nized the harshness of the general rule and the hardship it placed 
upon the plaintiff when the delay in filing a claim was due to igno­
rance of the cause of action, not from a plaintiff willfully sleeping on 
his rights.33 After being faced with situations in which foreign ob­
jects remained inside a patient following surgery, courts were willing 
to apply a "discovery rule" for determining the date of accrual for 
medical malpractice actions.34 A "discovery rule" was applicable 
because these cases did not raise the problems that the statute of 
limitations was originally designed to guard against, such as fraudu­
lent claims or difficulty of proof after the passage of time.35 The 
"discovery rule" generally states that limitations do not begin to run, 
that is, actions do not accrue, until the plaintiff knows, or with rea­
sonable diligence should know, of the injury and its cause.36 Implicit 
in the adoption of the discovery rule for medical malpractice cases 
was the courts' willingness to place a premium on the right of the 
injured plaintiff to have adequate notice of an injury and subse­
quently bring suit. This was done, however, at the expense of the 
policy supporting the prevention of litigating stale claims. 
In 1949, the United States Supreme Court in Urie v. Thomp­
son 37 adopted the discovery rule for determining when a cause of 
action accrues under the Federal Employer's Liability Act.38 Re­
jecting the government's argument that the act or omission rule gov­
erns the time when a cause of action accrues, the Court stated: 
We do not think the humane legislative plan intended such conse­
quences to attach to blameless ignorance. Nor do we think those 
two, bein~ the common time limit. This is for the purpose of protecting physi­
cians agamst unjustified claims; but since many of the consequences of medical 
malpractice often do not become known or apparent for a period longer than 
that of the statute, the injured plaintiff is left without a remedy. The second 
reason is that the nature of the tort itself and the character of the injury will 
frequently prevent knowledge of what is wrong, so that the plaintiff is forced to 
rely upon what he is told by the physician or surgeon. . 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899, Comment eat 444 (1979). 
33. Perdue, The Law of Texas Medical Malpractice, 11 Hous. L. REv. 825, 839 
(1974). 
34. See note 68 infra. 
35. Note, ProfeSSional Maipractice-StalUte ofLimitation-Cause ofAction Accrues 
in Professional Malpractice Tort Claim from the Date the Alleged Injury is Discovered­
Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion, Inc., v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 61 Ill. 2d 129, 
334 N.E.2d 160 (1975), 25 DE PAUL L. REv. 568, 571 (1976). 
36. See cases cited note 43 infra. 
37. 337 U.S. 163 (1949). 
38. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1976). 
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consequences can be reconciled with the traditional purposes of 
statutes of limitations, which conventionally require the assertion 
of claims within a specified period of time after notice of the inva­
sion of legal rigkts. 39 
In 1962 the Fifth Circuit, borrowing the blameless ignorance 
notion from Urie, adopted the discovery rule for medical malprac­
tice suits brought against the federal government under the FTCA.40 
In Quinton v. United States,41 the court held that a claim accrues 
when ''the claimant discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable dili­
gence should have discovered, the acts constituting the alleged 
malpractice."42 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM 
The unique aspect ofKubrick is the manner in which each fac­
tor associated with the accrual of an action under the discovery rule 
can stand alone without reasonably drawing suspicion to the other 
factors. These factors are knowledge, or reasonable suspicion, of: 
The injury; its cause; and that a breach of legal duty may have oc­
curred. IfA punched B, for example, it would be reasonable to as­
sume that at the time B was punched he knew or suspected: That he 
was injured; the cause of the injury; and that he may have a legal 
claim against A. All three factors emerged simultaneously. If, in­
stead, A poisoned B, B may know he felt uncomfortable but may not 
know the cause. Once B discovered the cause it would be reasonable 
to assume that B should at least suspect that he had a legal claim 
against A. This pattern is usually consistent with situations in which 
foreign objects remained in a patient following surgery. 
The problem is that breach of a legal duty was normally in­
ferred from the discovery of an injury and its cause.43 When 
39. 337 U.S. at 170 (emphasis added). 
40. Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1962). 
41. 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1962). 
42. Id at 240. In 1956, plaintiffs wife was admitted to Larson Air Force Base 
Hospital and given three transfusions of the wrong blood type. The wife did not learn of, 
and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have discovered, this error until her 
pregnancy in 1959. She gave birth to a stillborn child and subsequently brought suit. Id 
at 235. The court rejected the government's argument that the cause of action accrued at 
the time of the transfusion. Id at 240-41. 
43. Although most cases discuss discovery of the "acts of malpractice," they specif­
ically make findings of the time at which the plaintiff should have discovered the injury 
or its cause, thereby assuming that a breach of legal duty would naturally follow. See 
Zeidler v. United States, 601 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1979) (hearing granted to determine 
when plaintiff should have discovered his injury and its cause); Exnicious v. United 
States, 563 F.2d 418 (10th Cir. 1977) (plaintiff told that soreness after shoulder surgery 
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Kubrick discovered his injury, tinnitus, the cause could not be rea­
sonably suspected and, when the cause became known, Kubrick ar­
gued that negligence could not be reasonably suspected.44 That is, 
recognition or awareness of one factor could not reasonably alert 
Kubrick to suspect another factor. The application of the rationale 
of previous cases, particularly Quinton, to the facts of Kubrick 
presents difficulties arising primarily from the use of imprecise lan­
guage. Is "discovery of the malpractice" discovery of the injury, its 
cause, breach ofa legal duty, or a particular combination of some or 
all of these factors? 
In the majority of medical malpractice cases, discovery of the 
injury and its cause is all that is required to trigger the running of the 
statute of limitations because breach of a legal duty naturally can be 
inferred.45 In only one federal case has the Kubrick-type fact pattern 
been litigated under the FTCA. In Jordan v. United States,46 plain­
tiff suffered from chronic sinusitis and underwent nose surgery in the 
hope of alleviating his sinus condition. After the operation, compli­
cations arose in his left eye. Doctors, in response to his questions, 
told plaintiff that the eye problems were the result of muscle damage 
caused by the procedures required to deal with the unanticipated se­
verity of his sinus condition.47 In 1971, three years after the surgery, 
a doctor told plaintiff there was nothing more he could do for the eye 
and that it was ''too bad they screwed up your eye when they oper­
ated on your nose. "48 Plaintiff brought suit under the FTCA. The 
government claimed that the statute of limitations had run because 
plaintiff had been aware of his injury and its cause for more than two 
years. The Sixth Circuit found that the evidence failed to show that 
plaintiff "should have been aware that the muscle damage may have 
was due to traumatic arthritis, when actual cause was aseptic necrosis); Bridgeford v. 
United States, 550 F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1977) (plaintiff unaware of causal nexus between 
femoral vein severed during operation and later complications); Portis v. United States, 
483 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1973) (plaintiff unaware of causal nexus between improper admin­
istration of neomycin and her resulting deafness); Tyminski v. United States, 481 F.2d 
257 (3d Cir. 1973) (plaintiff told cause of paraplegia was arteriovenus angioma, when 
actual cause was epidural hematoma); Toal v. United States, 438 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1971) 
(plaintiff unaware of causal nexus between pantopaque retention from myelogram and 
subsequent brain damage); Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d at 234 (plaintiffs wife 
unaware of her injury). 
44. See cases cited note 60 infra. 
45. 444 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
46. 503 F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1974). 
47. Id at 621. 
48. Id. 
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been the result of ... improper performance ...."49 The Jordan 
court stated: 
Affirmance of the district court's decision under these circum­
stances would perpetrate an injustice similar to the one sought to 
be corrected by the adoption of the so-called "discovery" rule in 
the federal and state courts since appellant's claim would be 
barred prior to the time when he had any reasonable cause to be­
lieve that the acts which caused his injury were wrongful. 50 
The reasoning in Jordan is consistent with the blameless ignorance 
concept introduced in Urie. 
The district court in Kubrick reasoned that, because of the tech­
nical complexity of the case, a person exercising reasonable diligence 
would not have been alerted to the possibility that he may have been 
legally wronged.51 Though there was an awareness of the injury and 
its cause, the court stated there is a rebuttable presumption that 
knowledge of the injury and its cause will alert a reasonable person 
to suspect that he may have been the victim of negligence.52 Finding 
that Kubrick exercised reasonable diligence in pursuing his claim, 
the court stated that it did not believe it reasonable to start the stat­
ute running until plaintiff at least had reason to suspect that a legal 
duty to him had been breached. 53 The court's reasoning brought the 
blameless ignorance notion to its logical conclusion. 
Reversing the lower courts, the Supreme Court insisted that 
knowledge of the injury and its cause invokes an irrebutable pre­
sumption of invasion of legal rightS.54 The Court stated that once a 
plaintiff knows of his injury and its cause all he need do is make 
inquiries into whether he may be the victim of negligence.55 The 
Court's holding appears to be based generally on two factors: Con­
gressional intent and stale claims litigation. 
, The Court stated that "[t]here is nothing in the language or the 
legislative history of the. . . [FTCA] that provides a substantial ba­
sis for the Court of Appeals' construction of the accrual language of 
. [section] 2401(b)."56 This is correct; but, at the same time, there 
49. Id. at 624. 
50. Id. 
51. Kubrick v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 166, 185 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aJl'd in parI, 
remanded in parI, 581 F.2d 1092 (3d Cir. 1978), reJl'd, 444 U.S. III (1979). 
52. Id. at 182. 
53. Id. at 185-86. 
54. 444 U.S. at 122-24. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 119. 
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is no indication of congressional intent that would support the 
Supreme Court's construction of the accrual language.57 The 
Court's construction of congressional intent was premised upon the 
general proposition that Congress intended the prompt presentation 
of claims by setting a two-year limitations period.58 As the dissent 
pointed out, however, appellate courts have consistently applied the 
discovery rule for decades without any indication of congressional 
hostility.59 
The Court's fear of litigating stale claims is not unfounded; but, 
unless the Court is prepared to denounce the discovery rule entirely 
and insist upon instituting an act or omission rule, the possibility of 
litigating stale claims always is present. It appears that courts that 
have adopted the discovery rule have accepted the possible conse­
quence of litigation of stale claims in return for the equitable treat­
ment of the medical negligence victim. Whether the Supreme 
Court's fine tuning of the discovery rule in Kubrick actually will re­
duce the number of stale claims that would have been presented is a 
provocative question. The answer may lie in the realization that 
there have been only two cases presented in federal court over the 
past twenty years that have raised this question, Jordan and Kubrick. 
Also, in the vast majority of cases, negligence should be suspected.60 
In the few remaining cases, innocent or intentional misrepresenta­
tion could be alleged which would also have the effect of tolling the 
limitations period.61 Overall, the Court's decision will probably 
57. The Court essentially admitted that nothing instructive can be inferred from 
the legislative history. Id at 119 n.6. 
58. Id at 117. 
59. Id at 127. See also notes 37 & 38 supra and accompanying text. 
60. See, e.g., Casias v. United States, 532 F.2d 1339 (lOth Cir. 1976) (plaintiff rea­
sonably should have suspected negligence when after an injection injured a sciatic nerve, 
he was aware that resulting paralysis in left leg was caused by injection); Reilly v. United 
States, 513 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1975) (where doctor originally stated hoarse condition 
would quickly heal after endotracheal intubation, plaintiff reasonably should have sus­
pected negligence after discovery that tracheal stenosis had developed); Ciccarone v. 
United States, 486 F.2d 253 (3d Cir. 1973) (plaintiff reasonably should have suspected 
negligence when a deterioration in health was immediately apparent after injection of 
blue dye in plaintiJrs spinal column to determine cause of recurrent meningitis attacks); 
Brown v. United States, 353 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1965) (court found there was knowledge 
of sufficient facts to alert a reasonable person that there may have been negligence when 
parents knew that their premature child's blindness was caused by administration of ex­
cessive oxygen). 
61. Innocent or intentional misrepresentation as a defense to the running of the 
statute of limitations has yet to be asserted under the Federal Tort Claims Act, but has 
been readily accepted under other federal acts. See, e.g., Holifield v. Cities Servo Tanker 
Corp., 421 F. Supp. 131 (E.D. La. 1976) (unawareness of full extent of injury by plantitf 
in a case arising under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976), does not necessarily consti­
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have little impact upon reducing the number of stale claims that may 
be brought. 
IV. COMPARISON WITH STATE DECISIONS 
The same equitable principles that encouraged adoption of the 
discovery rule for medical negligence cases in federal courts also en­
couraged adoption of the discovery rule in state courts. A review of 
how state courts have handled the posited issue is enlightening. 
Only a limited number of jurisdictions have had the opportunity to 
litigate this specific issue.62 Until approximately seven years ago, the 
state legislatures were content to permit the courts to exercise a free 
hand in determining when causes of action would accrue. With the 
recent modification of many state statutes of limitations for medical 
malpractice, it appears that few states will have the opportunity to 
litigate the Kubrick issue. In assessing the reason for the modifica­
tion of many state statutes of limitations it may be concluded that 
the equitable principles of justice and fairness, which served as the 
foundation for the adoption of the discovery rule, have been seri­
ously assaulted in the past six years by the realities of business 
economics. 
When insurance companies intimated that medical malpractice 
was becoming an uninsurable risk,63 state legislatures were quick to 
intervene and enact comprehensive medical malpractice legislation 
that involved, among other things, modifying the statute of limita­
tions for medical malpractice actions.64 The problem is stated in 
Utah's legislative findings set out in its Medical Malpractice Act: 
tute innocent or intentional misrepresentation by doctor when true extent of injury not 
determined until surgery); Mumpower v. Southern Ry. Co., 270 F. Supp. 318 (W.O. Va. 
1967) (innocent misrepresentation held a valid defense in a case arising under the Fed­
eral Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1976), when doctor informed plainti1f he 
suffered no injuries when, in fact, plaintiff had ruptured disc that required surgery). 
62. See generally Leary v. Rupp, 89 Mich. App. 145,280 N.W.2d 466 (1979); AI­
fone v. Sarno, 139 N.J. Super. 518, 354 A.2d 654 (1976); Ohler v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 92 
Wash. 2d 507, 598 P.2d 1358 (1979). 
63. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, MEDICAL MALPRACfICE: 
REpORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACflCE (1973); Redish, Leg­
is/alive Response to tile Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutiona/lmp/ications, 
55 TEX. L. REv. 759 (1977); Note, Medical Malpractice Statute ofLimitations as Special 
Legislation, Woodward v. Burnham City Hospital, 60 m. App. 3d 285, 377 N.E.2d 290 
(1978), 55 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 519 (1979). Some authorities dispute the existence of a 
medical malpractice crisis. See Cunningham & Lane, Malpractice-TIre Illusory Crisis, 
54 FLA. BJ. 114 (1980); Fuchberg, Mytits of Medical Malpractice, 11 TRIAL L.Q. 49 
(1976). 
64. See note 67 infra. 
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The legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and 
claims for damages. . . from health care has increased greatly in 
recent years. Because of these increases the insurance industry has 
substantially increased the cost of medical malpractice 
insurance.... 
In view of these recent trends, . . . it is necessary to protect the 
public interest by enacting measures designed to encourage pri­
vate insurance companies to continue to provide health-related 
malpractice insurance. . . . 
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to provide a 
reasonable time in which actions may be commenced against 
health care providers while limiting that time to a spectfic period 
for which professional liability insurance premiums can be rea­
sonably and accurately calculated ....65 
Legislative limiting of the amount of time within which a medi­
cal malpractice claim may be brought to within a specific period 
from the date of the negligent act illustrates that the policy of at­
tempting to compensate all victims of medical negligence through 
the judicial adoption of the discovery rule clearly has yielded to eco­
nomic realities. This does not reduce the viability of continued in­
quiry, however, because the discovery rule still survives within the 
confines of the act or omission rule. An example of this type of hy­
brid discovery rule has been adopted in North Dakota and states: 
The following actions must be commenced within two years after 
the cause of action has accrued: 
3. An action. for the recovery of damages resulting from mal­
practice, provided, however, that the limitation of an action 
against a physician or licensed hospital will not be extended be­
yond six years of the act or omission of alleged malpractice by a 
nondiscovery thereof ....66 
Twenty-four jurisdictions67 have adopted this hybrid limitations 
65. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-2 (1976) (emphasis added). 
66. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(3) (Supp. 1977). 
67. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-482 (1975); CAL. [CIV. hOC.] CODE § 340.5 (West Cum. 
Supp. 1981); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-80-105 (Cum. Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 52-584 (West Cum. Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18. § 6856 (Cum. Supp. 1980); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95. 11(4)(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1981); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 657-7.3 
(Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); IOWA CoDE ANN. 
§ 614.1(9) (West Cum. Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 6O-513(7)(c) (1976); Ky. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 413.140(2) (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1980); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:5628 
(West Supp. 1981); MD. [CTs. & JUD. hoc.] CODE ANN. § 5-109 (1980); NEV. REv. 
STAT. § 41A.097 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (Cum. Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 28-01-18(3) (Supp. 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 18 (West Cum. Supp. 
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statute, while twelve jurisdictions68 retain the unadulterated discov­
ery rule. 
Relatively few jurisdictions have litigated the issue posited in 
Kubrick .69 Because many of the new hybrid statutes specifically 
state that a claim accrues when a claimant reasonably should have 
discovered his injury, the issue will be moot in these jurisdictions. 
The imprecise language employed in pre-Kubrick federal cases has 
plagued the few courts that have touched upon the issue of accruapo 
Courts that have litigated the correctly articulated issue generally 
have chosen to follow the rationale of the Kubrick district court. The 
Washington Supreme Court and appellate courts in Michigan and 
New Jersey are three such examples. 
In Ohler v. Tacoma General Hospital,7} the Washington 
Supreme Court held that appellant's claim "did not accrue until she 
discovered all the essential elements of her possible cause of action, 
i.e., duty, breach, causation, damages."72 In Michigan the court of 
appeals held that for an action to accrue, a person must discover "the 
1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 12.110(4) (1979); S.C. CODE § 15-3-545 (Cum. Supp. 1980); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3415 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-4 (Supp. 
1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 521 (Cum. Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 4.16.350 (Cum. Supp. 1981); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.55 (West Cum. Supp. 1981). 
68. See Bums v. Bell, 409 A.2d 614 (D.C. 1979); Franklin v. Albert., 1980 Mass. 
o Adv. Sh. 2187,411 N.E.2d 458; Dyke v. Richard, 390 Mich. 739, 213 N.W.2d 185 (1973); 
Johnson v. St. Patrick's Hosp., 148 Mont. 125,417 P.2d 469 (1966); Spath v. Morrow, 174 
Neb. 38, 115 N.W.2d 581 (1962); Shillady v. Elliot Community Hosp., 114 N.H. 321, 320 
A.2d 637 (1974); Femandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961); Ayers v. Morgan, 
397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959); Wilkinson v. Harrington, 104 R.I. 224, 243 A.2d 745 
(1968); Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967); Morgan v. Grace Hosp., Inc., 149 
W. Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156 (1965); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-3-107 (1977). 
69. See notes 71-74 infra and accompanying text. 
70. In Florida, notice of "invasion of legal rights" has been construed to mean 
notice of the "cause." Tetstone v. Adams; 373 So. 2d 362, 363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); 
Almengor v. Dade County, 359 So. 2d 892, 894 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). 
Although the New Hampshire Supreme Court ardently supported plaintiffs position 
that an action should not accrue until plaintiff suspected "negligence," a reading of the 
facts of the case indicates that it was actually the "cause" of the injury that was not 
suspected by plaintiff. Browti. v. Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hosp., 117 N.H. 739, 744, 
378 A.2d 1138, 1141 (1977). 
71. 92 Wash. 2d 507, 598 P.2d 1358 (1979). 
72. Id at 511,598 P.2d at 1360. Plaintiffwas born prematurely and placed in an 
incubator. She was administered ''too much oxygen" which caused her loss of sight. 
Plaintiff knew that her blindness was caused from too much oxygen but always believed 
that the oxygen had been administered properly and was necessary for her treatment as a 
premature baby. Id at 508-09, 598 P.2d at 1359. The court found it was a question of 
fact whether plaintiff knew or should have known that the result was a breach of the 
hospital's duty. Id at 51D-ll, 598 P.2d at 1360. But see Brown v. United States, 353 F.ld 
578 (9th Cir. 1965); Itenn v. Northwestern Memorial Hosp., 73 m. App. 3d 694, 392 
N.E.2d 440 (1979). 
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act or omission itself, . . . and have a good reason to believe the act 
itself was improper. . . ."73 The New Jersey Superior Court, Appel­
late Division, stated that for triggering the start of the statute of limi­
tations the patient needed to discover that the injury ''was related to 
fault on the part of the physician as distinguished from mere knowl­
edge of a causal relationship . . . between the doctor's acts and the 
injury."74 These are essentially the only cases that have differenti­
ated between the time of the discovery of the injury, its cause, and 
suspicion of negligence. 
Other jurisdictions have litigated cases that essentially parallel 
Kubrick-type fact patterns, but the courts have failed to recognize 
the issue in Kubrick-like terms. Appellate courts in the District of 
Columbia and Texas have held that it is a question for the trier of 
fact to determine when a claimant should have discovered his in­
jury.7S In those cases, however, the physical injury and its cause 
were always mown by the claimants. Based on a reading of the 
facts, the courts actually implied that the limitations period starts, 
not when the claimant discovers the injury, but when the claimant 
should have suspected that the physician's conduct was negligent. 
73. Leary v. Rupp, 89 Mich. App. 145, 149, 280 N.W.2d 466, 468 (1979). The 
patient developed an allergic reaction from the drugs prescribed by defendant. The pa­
tient knew the allergic reaction was caused by the drugs. The court stated that ''while the 
plaintiff knew of some of the acts, i.e., the prescribing of polycillin and prednisone, and 
the resulting harm, allergic reaction and pain in the legs, reasonable minds could differ as 
to when she should have realized that the doctor had acted improperly." Id at 149-50, 
280 N.W.2d at 468. 
74. Alfone v. Sarno, 139 N.J. Super. 518, 520, 354 A.2d 654,655 (1976). 
75. Plaintiff, in Burns v. Bell, 409 A.2d 614 (D.C. 1979), received a facelift opera­
tion from defendant. After surgery, in August 1968, plaintiff noticed what she called 
"gross scars" and also experienced numbness around the surgical area. Defendant indi­
cated that these conditions would improve with time, and later assured plaintiff that she 
was progressing satisfactorily. Id at 614-15. Plaintiff, in 1974, recommended defendant 
to one of her friends and after seeing the results of her friend's surgery, concluded that 
she had not healed properly. Plaintiff subsequently brought suit in 1977. Id at 615. The 
court of appeals remanded for a determination of when plaintiff should have reasonably 
discovered her injury. Id at 617-18. 
The appellate court in Texas similarly held that the question of when plaintiff 
should have discovered her injury is a factual inquiry. Fitzpatrick v. Marlowe, 553 
S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). Defendant operated oil plaintiff to alleviate a sinus 
condition and to remove a small bump from her nose. Her nose swelled and the bump 
remained. After defendant's assurances that plaintifl's nose would improve, plaintiff un­
derwent a second operation to correct the bump. Plaintiff then had a dip in her nose 
instead of a bump, and again her doctor assured her that her nose would improve. In 
1975, another physician advised plaintiff that her nose had been "messed up," where­
upon plaintiff filed suit. Id at 193-94. 
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v. PRACTICAL EFFECT AND CONSIDERATIONS 

The patent effect of Kubrick is that it overrules the holding in 
Jordan. It also overrules a line of dictum used in federal cases since 
Urie stating that a malpractice action accrues when the plaintiff sus­
pects the invasion of his legal rightS.76 
The latent effect of the decision is more devastating. In an at­
tempt to bar a very limited number of medical malpractice claims 
from being litigated in federal court, the Supreme Court has, in ef­
fect, created, in every government hospital,77 a nonlegal presumption 
of negligence for every unsuccessful treatment or unforeseeable re­
sult regardless of how innocent the action may have been. In a med­
ical community that is already bitter over the jurisprudential 
intervention into its profession,78 Kubrick will place further strain on 
those sentiments by requiring patients to investigate and scrutinize 
unsuccessful results of their treatment. Under similar circumstances, 
Judge Pashman of the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that "[t]he 
majority's position in this regard assumes a consciousness of poten­
tiallitigation that is unrealistic even in the litigious society we live in 
today and will, on pain of forfeiture, force persons to act with exces­
sive caution to safeguard their legal rightS."79 
The corollary to these latent effects is just as significant. The 
economic strains on the patient of retaining an attorney, consulting 
medical experts, and possibly employing discovery procedures, only 
to be advised that one's treatment was proper, is unjust and unrea­
sonable. In view of the' established "conspiracy of silence" in the 
medical profession, the Supreme Court's assertion that the patient 
needs merely to consult another physician is rather tenuous.80 In 
addition, it would be a spurious assumption to reasonably expect a 
patient to consult with another physician when the patient does not 
suspect any wrongdoing. Likewise, it would be equally unjust to im­
76. See notes 43 & 60 supra. 
77. ''The VA operates the largest hospital system in the nation. Included in its 
program are about 170 separate hospitals, with almost 100,000 beds, in which about I 
million patients each year receive treatment." D. AOOLESTONE, S. HEWMAN & F. 
GROSS, THE RIGHTS OF VETERANS 193 (1978). 
78. See Cohn, Medical Malpractice Litigation: A Plague on Doth Houses, 52 
A.B.A.I. 32 (1966); Dean, A Physician's View, 49 FLA. B.I. 504 (1975); Demy, Practice 
and Malpractice (One Doctor's Viewpoint), 19 MEO. TRIAL TECH. Q. 61 (1973); Powers, 
Interprofessional Education and The Reduction ofMedico-Legal Tensions, 17 1. LEGAL 
Eouc. 167 (1964). 
79. Burd v. New Iersey Tel. Co., 76 N.I. 284, 298-99, 386 A.2d 1310, 1318 (1978) 
(products liability action). 
80. 444 U.S. at 128-29 n.4 (Stevens, 1., dissenting). 
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pute constructive knowledge of the effect of Kubrick upon all who 
enter a government hospital. 
Yet, to maintain a perspective on how Kubrick and the issue of 
accrual should be resolved, it must be remembered that state courts 
were first to recognize the inherent inequities in applying the act or 
omission rule to medical negligence cases and, consequently, 
adopted the discovery rule. Federal courts followed suit. The lag 
can be attributed to the nonexistence of medical negligence claims 
against the government until the legislative waiver of government 
tort immunity through the enactment of the FTCA. Federal case 
law has, since then, progressed far beyond that of many states. 
There are some state courts, however, that have resolved the Kubrick 
issue. Federal courts have failed to take cognizance of these deci­
sions. Nevertheless, while the federal courts have been oblivious to 
the state court decisions since the adoption of the discovery rule in 
Quinton, the equities that spurred both the state and federal courts to 
adopt the discovery rule are now being compromised in the state 
legislatures because of the economic realities of the insurance crisis. 
State legislators realized that an attempt to compensate all who have 
been injured could have resulted in.no one being compensated. 
The conception that insurance companies have huge reserves of 
money to compensate those who are injured must go by the wayside. 
The same misconception might be attributed to the federal govern­
ment: The same concerns that affected the state legislatures may also 
affect the federal government. Justice Holmes stated, "The life of 
the law has not been logic: it has been experience."81 Perhaps the 
equitable principles that encouraged abandonment of the logical act 
or omission rule must now, in light of economic realities, act to re­
strain the equitable logic of the discovery rule. If this is the case, 
perhaps there should be constraints on the presently unencumbered 
discovery rule as it exists within the FTCA. An adjustment that 
would act to create a hybrid discovery82 rule is within the proper 
scope of the legislature. The unintentional, negligible effort by the 
Supreme Court to limit the discovery rule eventually will do more 
harm than good. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Statutes of limitations essentially are statutes of repose. Their 
original purpose was to protect the defendant from having to defend 
81. O. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
82. See note 67 supra and accompanying text. 
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himself against stale and sometimes fraudulent claims. Simultane­
ously, however, statutes of limitations might also preclude what 
otherwise may be a valid claim. Originally, an action would aCcrue 
at the time of the tortious act or omission. This standard caused 
great injustices in cases of medical malpractice. Recognizing the 
harshness of the general rule, courts displayed a willingness to place 
a premium on the rights of the plaintiff by adoptmg a discovery rule. 
The discovery rule has been used for over eighteen years to deter­
mine when a medical malpractice claim accrues under the FTCA, 
without congressional complaint. Despite this silence, the United 
States Supreme Court found that the prompt presentation of claims 
is of paramount interest to the legislature and consequently held that 
a patient's claim had accrued before the time that he became aware 
that a legal duty owed to him had been breached. The arguments 
used by the Court are tenuous .. Even in light of the recent trend to 
reduce the number of medical malpractice claims, the adverse effects 
associated with the Supreme Court's limiting of the discovery rule 
cannot be justified. If there is a desire or need to cut back on the 
number of medical malpractice claims under the FTCA, particularly 
stale claims, Congress is in the proper position to take action. Enact­
ment of a hybrid discovery rule as that adopted by North Dakota 
and twenty-three other jurisdictions appears to be the most equitable 
solution. 
Robert Muscara 
